WUI (Writing under the influence)

I'm not sure what happened but somebody read some of what I wrote here and is giving me hard time about it by repeating the tired and simplistic canards and using a lot of invective. But I still thought it would be good to answer.

War.

The only thing I regret is that out of many reasons that Bush gave, WMD is the only one most people remember. Maybe it was done on purpose by the left and the media (but I repeat myself) because that one, so far, has turned out to be mostly false. However, just because something has turned to be false doesn't mean that anybody lied. It's enough to go back to the pre-9/11 years and see what the left and the media talked about as far as WMD in Iraq were concerned.

Other arguments, like the one about the US having created Saddam in the first place are simply childish. The US was and the Soviets were allies during WWII and then became bitter enemies. The US helped Iraq because the US was and still are in war with Iran. It was one of many proxy battles with the Soviets. And it worked. Soviet Union is no more. My old country is free. Sure, Putin is not Sarkozy but at this point at least we have nothing to fear from Russia. Unless one considers the help Russia gives Iran. But I hope that by the time Bush leaves office something will be done about Iran.

As far as the civil war vs. genocide argument is concerned and why we should stay in Iraq and not go to Sudan is best expressed by James Taranto in yesterday's Best of the Web Today:

Whether Congress made a mistake in authorizing Iraq's liberation is a separate question from what to do now. Yet war opponents act as if favoring a precipitous withdrawal logically and necessarily follows from regretting the decision to liberate.

Why? Part of it, we suppose, is a sort of binary simplemindedness: It was bad to go in, ergo it would be good to get out. Real life is more complicated. It may be that it was a mistake to go in but a precipitous withdrawal would compound the error.

But maybe those who argue for withdrawal seek precisely to compound the error. Failure in Iraq would vindicate the position of those who originally argued that the war would be a mistake. Likewise for those who supported the war but later changed their minds--they may be cynical opportunists, but they may also have the zeal of a convert. If America loses the war, they win the argument.

And defeat in Iraq would vindicate not only opposition to Iraq but an entire worldview--what we've called the worldview of baby-boom liberalism. America's defeat in Vietnam was a triumph for baby-boom liberalism--a triumph that some seem never to have given up trying to relive.

In this respect, it's telling that Brian Baird, though liberal, is relatively young. He was born in 1956 and finished college in 1977, which means that the Vietnam tumult had wound down by the time he reached majority. To be sure, baby-boom liberalism has influence beyond its immediate age cohort (cf Barack Obama, born 1961). But maybe Baird is a tribune of a younger, more sensible type of liberal, one that cares more about doing right than being proved right.

I'm convinced that many people who want the US out of Iraq want to do so to punish Bush or to see the US fail again, or both.

Domestic situation.

I would not live in any other country. And I could live almost anywhere in Europe given my and my wife's ties to that continent. Although there are many problems that still need to be solved: social security, school choice, nuclear energy, land use, immigration, liberalism, political-correctness, multiculturalism and moral equivalenceetc, etc., I couldn't imagine moving back to Europe or going to Canada.

SUVs

Even if I acknowledged that my SUV is somehow subsidized, I subsidize many much more expensive, useless and simply stupid liberal projects such as light rail, land use, welfare, social security, medicare, etc. For example, if all gas taxes were spent wisely there would be some left to pay Pentagon for protecting our oil supplies and to fix all the bridges.

As far as being a Republican and thus using as much as possible is concerned, how about this one: family of six in 1,900 sq. ft?

The comparison between Prius and SUVs was about the total environmental impact and not just the gas consumed.

Resources

We don't consume 25% of all resources. We consume 25% of consumed resources. There is plenty more. We are not stealing from anybody.

I don't believe humans cause global warming so I don't really care about how much CO2 my car produces. What car would you suggest I buy to haul 6 people and all the stuff I need to go camping? Or am I not allow to go on vacation? We do have a mini-van but it's not enough anymore.

In short, I say we stay in Iraq until the country can defend itself, we do something about Iran, and we start thinking seriously about nuclear energy (btw, biofuels are not good).

Also, we allow people to take care of themselves. Give me school choice. Let me decide how I want to invest my money and what care I buy or where I build my next house. The left talks about losing freedoms under Bush but as soon as the left gets anywhere near the power, it limits my real and important freedoms.

Lastly, as usual, there is a lot of projection going on when one listens to anything the left says.

UPDATE 8/21 5:37PM:
This should take care of assigning blame for 9/11:

WASHINGTON (AP) - The CIA's top leaders failed to use their available powers, never developed a comprehensive plan to stop al-Qaida and missed crucial opportunities to thwart two hijackers in the run-up to Sept. 11, the agency's own watchdog concluded in a bruising report released Tuesday.
Completed in June 2005 and kept classified until now, the 19-page executive summary finds extensive fault with the actions of senior CIA leaders and others beneath them. "The agency and its officers did not discharge their responsibilities in a satisfactory manner," the CIA inspector general found.

"They did not always work effectively and cooperatively," the report stated.

Yet the review team led by Inspector General John Helgerson found neither a "single point of failure nor a silver bullet" that would have stopped the attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people.

In a statement, CIA Director Michael Hayden said the decision to release the report was not his choice or preference, but that he was making the report available as required by Congress in a law President Bush signed earlier this month.

"I thought the release of this report would distract officers serving their country on the front lines of a global conflict," Hayden said. "It will, at a minimum, consume time and attention revisiting ground that is already well plowed."

The report does cover terrain heavily examined by a congressional inquiry and the Sept. 11 Commission. However, the CIA watchdog's report goes further than previous reviews to examine the personal failings of individuals within the agency who led the pre-9/11 efforts against al-Qaida.

Helgerson's team found that no CIA employees violated the law or were part of any misconduct. But it still called on then-CIA Director Porter Goss to form accountability boards to look at the performance of specific individuals to determine whether reprimands were called for.

The inquiry boards were recommended for officials including former CIA Director George Tenet, his deputy director for operations Jim Pavitt, Counterterrorism Center Chief Cofer Black, and agency Executive Director A.B. "Buzzy" Krongard.

In October 2005, Goss rejected the recommendation. He said he had spoken personally with the current employees named in the report, and he trusted their abilities and dedication. "The report unveiled no mysteries," Goss said.

Hayden stuck by Goss's decision.

Providing a glimpse of a series of shortfalls laid out in the longer, still-classified report, the executive summary says:

—U.S. spy agencies, which were overseen by Tenet, lacked a comprehensive strategic plan to counter Osama bin Laden prior to 9/11. The inspector general concluded that Tenet "by virtue of his position, bears ultimate responsibility for the fact that no such strategic plan was ever created."

—The CIA's analysis of al-Qaida before Sept. 2001 was lacking. No comprehensive report focusing on bin Laden was written after 1993, and no comprehensive report laying out the threats of 2001 was assembled. "A number of important issues were covered insufficiently or not at all," the report found.

—The CIA and the National Security Agency tussled over their responsibilities in dealing with al-Qaida well into 2001. Only Tenet's personal involvement could have led to a timely resolution, the report concluded.

—The CIA station charged with monitoring bin Laden—code-named Alec Station—was overworked, lacked operational experience, expertise and training. The report recommended forming accountability boards for the CIA Counterterror Center chiefs from 1998 to 2001, including Black.

—Although 50 to 60 people read at least one CIA cable about two of the hijackers, the information wasn't shared with the proper offices and agencies. "That so many individuals failed to act in this case reflects a systemic breakdown.... Basically, there was no coherent, functioning watch-listing program," the report said. The report again called for further review of Black and his predecessor.

While blame is heaped on Tenet and his deputies, the report also says that Tenet was forcefully engaged in counterterrorism efforts and personally sounded the alarm before Congress, the military and policymakers. In a now well-known 1998 memo, he declared, "We are at war."

The trouble, the report said, was follow-up.

In a statement, Tenet said the inspector general is "flat wrong" about the lack of plan.

"There was in fact a robust plan, marked by extraordinary effort and dedication to fighting terrorism, dating back to long before 9/11," he said. "Without such an effort, we would not have been able to give the president a plan on Sept. 15, 2001, that led to the routing of the Taliban, chasing al-Qaida from its Afghan sanctuary and combating terrorists across 92 countries."

The inspector general did take exception to findings of Congress' joint inquiry into 9/11. For instance, the congressional inquiry found that the CIA was reluctant to seek authority to assassinate bin Laden. Instead, the inspector general believed the problem was the agency's limited covert-action capabilities.

The CIA's reliance on a group of sources with questionable reliablity "proved insufficient to mount a credible operation against bin Laden," the report said. "Efforts to develop other options had limited potential prior to 9/11."